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Introduction
What do monetary policymakers need to know
and when do they need to know it? Textbook
descriptions and academic discussions of
policymaking usually ignore the practical prob-
lems faced by those who make the decisions
and take the actions. While most economists
would agree that monetary policy has real
short-run effects and is most likely neutral in
the long run, they could provide no more than
informed speculation in helping decide at what
level to set the target for a policy instrument
and when to change it.
This paper’s purpose is to outline the type 
of information monetary policymakers need in
practice, and to examine the data to see what
we actually know.1 Any policy rule must be for-
mulated in several clearly defined steps. First,
one must identify an operational instrument,
best thought of as something policymakers can
control precisely, like the federal funds rate or
the monetary base. Next, there must be a target.
Many central banks have stated that price stabil-
ity is their goal, but an obvious alternative to
targeting the aggregate price level is targeting
nominal income.2 In addition to choosing the
target variable itself, formulating policy necessi-
tates specifying a loss function: What is the rela-
tive importance of large and small, or positive
and negative, deviations of aggregate prices
from their target path? One might also assign a
cost to large movements in the target variable.
For example, it might be important for the Fed-
eral Reserve to have a reputation for changing
the federal funds rate target smoothly, without
large movements or sudden reversals, to avoid
creating uncertainty in financial markets.
The next stage in devising a monetary rule is
to link the operating instrument with the target.
This requires specification and estimation of a
macroeconomic model. One needs quantitative
answers to questions of the form “If the federal
funds rate is moved by one percentage point,
what will be the path of the aggregate price
level and real output over the following three
years?’’ Not only do we require a point estimate
of this response function, but it is also crucial
that we know how precise our knowledge is in
a statistical sense.
n 1 This work is based on Cecchetti (1995).
n 2 I will not discuss the difference between price-level and inflation
targeting. While this is a potentially important practical distinction, it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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Finally, policymakers need a timely estimate
of their target variable’s future pathin the ab-
sence of any policy actions. In other words,
they must know when external shocks hit the
economy, how large they are, and what their
impact on the time path of aggregate prices
and real output will be.
The next section offers a detailed discussion
of the modeling issue: How do we formulate
and estimate the necessary simple, dynamic,
empirical macroeconomic model? The section’s
first major part looks at econometric identifica-
tion. What must we assume in order to disen-
tangle the fluctuations in output and prices into
their various components? How might we actu-
ally estimate the impact of monetary policy on
macroeconomic quantities of interest?
The section’s second major part discusses
the issue of structural stability. Monetary policy-
makers change their emphasis fairly frequently,
focusing on one indicator one year and another
the next. How does this affect our attempt to
estimate the relationship between the variables
that policymakers control (like the federal
funds rate) and the things we care about? Can
we estimate a stable relationship between out-
put, prices, and interest rates over any reason-
able period?
The methodological discussion of modeling
issues is followed by section II, in which I pre-
sent a particular model and examine its proper-
ties. Several different types of results are
included. First, I look at the impact of different
sources of shocks on the variables of interest.
Besides allowing answers to questions like “If
the federal funds rate were to rise by 100 basis
points, how much would output change over
the next three years?” this approach makes it
possible to examine the sources of fluctuations
in output and prices. For example, has mone-
tary policy been responsible for a significant
share of output variation over the past decade?
Section III discusses how a policy rule can
be formulated. The first step is to specify an
objective function: What do policymakers actu-
ally want to stabilize? This discussion empha-
sizes the need for taking account of imprecision
when forming a policy rule. We are uncertain
how changes in the interest rate affect the size
and timing of output and price movements.
This means we cannot confidently predict pol-
icy actions’ impact on target variables, so that
policy actions differ from what they would be
if we had perfect knowledge. From the theoret-
ical discussion, I move on to examine several
possible objective functions of policy and the
interest rate paths implied by the combination
of each rule and the estimated model. I focus
throughout on the importance of employing
rules that recognize the imprecision of our
knowledge regarding the size of the linkages
we need to estimate.
I reach three significant conclusions: First,
since prices take time to respond to all types of
economic shocks, the objective of price stability
implies raising the federal funds rate immedi-
ately after a shock, instead of waiting for prices
to rise. Second, and more important, comparing
the results of price-level targeting with those of
nominal-income targeting implies that the diffi-
culties inherent in forecasting and controlling
the former provide an argument for concentrat-
ing on the latter. Finally, it is possible to use
policy rules to see how closely recent move-
ments in the federal funds rate conform to
those implied by either price-level or nominal-
income targeting rules. The results show that
the policy that is optimal in this limited sense
involves faster, bigger movements than those
shown by the actual federal funds rate path.
This suggests that policymakers’ actions have
been based on something akin to nominal-
income targeting, but with costs attached to
interest rate movements.
I. Modeling Issues
The single biggest problem in formulating mon-
etary policy rules is how to construct an empiri-
cal macroeconomic model that describes the
critical aspects of the economy. It is important
that the model be dynamic, summarizing the
impacts of shocks to the economy—as well as
those of intended policy actions—over time.
The standard response to this challenge has
been to construct various forms of vector
autoregressions (VAR). A VAR can answer a
question of the following type: “If the federal
funds rate moves, when and by how much
does the price level change?” Policymakers
require quantitative answers to exactly these
kinds of questions.
To construct any usable empirical model, a
researcher must make a number of choices. I
will describe four of these: 1) Which variables
should be included in the model? 2) What is
the appropriate measure of monetary policy?
3) How can the model be identified economet-
rically? and 4) Over what sample period should
the model be estimated?
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Variable Inclusion
When trying to discern the relationship between
inflation, output, and monetary policy, should
we include other variables in the model? Our
answer is guided by the findings of Sims (1992),
who estimates a model with prices, output, and
an interest rate for several countries. His robust
overall conclusion is that with this specification,
increases in the interest rate (which should sig-
nal policy contractions) lead to prices that are
higher than otherwise expected, not lower. This
problem, which came to be known as the “price
puzzle,” can be eliminated by including com-
modity prices in the model. The reasoning is
that the policymaker has additional knowledge
about prices’ future path that the three-variable
model does not adequately summarize. Policy
contractions, being based on this omitted infor-
mation, signal that these other indicators are
pointing toward higher prices.
More recent research, like that of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996a, 1996b), has
shown that including commodity prices elimi-
nates the puzzle. They suggest that higher com-
modity prices mean higher future overall
prices, and that policymakers respond to this.
In other words, an upward move in commodity
prices precedes both a rise in the price level
and a tightening of policy in the form of an
increase in the federal funds rate. The omission
of this information from the original Sims for-
mulation led to a bias in which contractionary
policy predicts higher aggregate prices. This is
not a policy change, but simply a reaction to
external events. The models of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans do have the following
property: Moving toward a more contractionary
monetary policy drives prices down (relative to




Beyond the question of which variables the
model should include, it is necessary to specify
a monetary policy instrument. Should one
assume that policymakers are focusing on the
federal funds rate itself (or behaving as if they
were), or would it be more realistic to use non-
borrowed reserves as the instrument? The litera-
ture takes up this issue in some detail.3 Because
events of the past 15 years suggest that the pri-
mary focus has been on the federal funds rate, I
will assume that it contains the information
necessary to gauge policy actions.4
Identification
A model builder’s most complex decision is for-
mulating a set of “identifying assumptions.”
This is also the subtlest issue and the one that
has generated the most discussion in the litera-
ture. It is like the textbook question about esti-
mating supply and demand curves: There, if
data on the price and quantity of a good in a
market both move, we cannot tell whether the
root cause of the change was a shift in supply
or a shift in demand. Here, things are a bit less
transparent, because there are no clearly de-
fined supply and demand curves in the stan-
dard microeconomic sense. Instead, it is neces-
sary to distinguish whether prices, output, and
interest rates moved as a result of policy shifts,
or because of factors like changes in the price
of oil (an aggregate supply shock) or in the de-
mand for money (an aggregate demand shock).
To understand the problem and its solution
more fully, we can begin by writing down a
dynamic structural model in its moving-average
form:
(1) pt = A11(L)ept + A12(L)ect
+ A13(L)eyt +A14(L)ut
(2) pt
c = A21(L)ept + A22(L)ect
+ A23(L)eyt +A24(L)ut
(3) yt = A31(L)ept + A32(L)ect
+ A33(L)eyt +A34(L)ut
(4) rt = A41(L)ept + A42(L)ect
+ A43(L)eyt +A44(L)ut ,
where pt, pt
c, and yt are the logs of the aggre-
gate price level, commodity prices, and output,
respectively, rt is the policy indicator, the e’s
are exogenous shocks, and u is the policy
innovation. Equations (1)–(4) summarize the
impact of all the shocks to the economy. The







= a110ept + a111ept – 1+ .... .
n 3 See, for example, discussions in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1996a, 1996b) and Bernanke and Mihov (1995). 
n 4 Most results are unaffected by the substitution of nonborrowed
reserves, suggesting that the funds rate elasticity of reserve demand is
relatively stable.
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Because we do not observe the shocks, it is
not possible to estimate the model (1)–(4) di-
rectly. Instead, we estimate the more familiar
VAR form and place restrictions on the coeffi-
cients (the aijk’s) in order to recover estimates
of the shocks.
Identification entails determining the errors
in this four-equation system, that is, the actual
sources of disturbances that lead to variation 
in prices, output, and interest rates. As the ap-
pendix to this paper describes, when there are
four endogenous variables, six restrictions are
required for complete identification.
All identification schemes involve assump-
tions about how these sources of variation are
correlated. Researchers use two types of restric-
tions for this purpose. The first, based on the
pioneering work of Sims (1980), is what I will
call a “triangular identification,” which assumes
that a shock does not affect a variable contem-
poraneously, and so one or more of the aij0’s
are zero. For example, it is commonly assumed
that no variable other than policy itself responds
to monetary shocks immediately, and so a140=
a240=a340= 0.
A more formal description of a triangular
identification begins by writing the matrix A(0)
that is composed of all the coefficients of the
Aij(0)’s—that is, all the aij0’s. Triangular identi-
fication means assuming that six of these aij0’s
are zero, and so
(5) A(0) = .
In other words, triangular identification
means that the monetary policy shock ut is
identified by assuming that no variable other
than the federal funds rate responds to it con-
temporaneously. The output shock, eyt, is iden-
tified by assuming that it is the portion of the
error in the output equation that is orthogonal
to the policy shock, while the commodity price
shock, ect, is the portion of the error in the 
commodity price equation that is orthogonal to
these. The final part of the residual in the ag-
gregate price equation that is orthogonal to all
three of these is the aggregate price shock, ept.
There are many other ways to constrain 
the four-variable VAR and achieve identifica-
tion. One, based on the work of Galí (1992),
combines two types of restrictions. The first are
contemporaneous and resemble those used in
the triangular method. The second, following
Blanchard and Quah (1989), assume that some
shocks have temporary, but not permanent, ef-
fects on some variables. For example, we might
claim that monetary shocks have no long-run
effects on real output, and so the impact of ut
on yt  dies out. Formally, this involves assuming




Recalling that we need six restrictions, the
Galí-style procedure begins with two contem-
poraneous restrictions based on the logic of
data availability and the time people in the
economy take to act. The first constraint is that
monetary policy does not affect real output
contemporaneously (within the month). In the
notation used above, the assumption is that
a340 = 0. This seems sensible, since production
planning is unlikely to change suddenly after a
policy innovation. The second constraint is that
the aggregate price level does not enter the
money supply rule. This also seems sensible,
because the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not
publicly release the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) until the month following its price survey.
The Galí-style, long-run restrictions, based
on Blanchard and Quah (1989), amount to
assumptions that neither monetary policy nor
aggregate price (other aggregate demand)
shocks permanently affect real output or the
real commodity price level.
Together, the two contemporaneous and
four long-run restrictions allow us to estimate
the impact of monetary policy shocks on prices
and output.
Structural Stability
Variable inclusion and identification are related.
The way in which we name various estimated
shocks in a model obviously depends on the
quantities being modeled in the first place.
While connected to the other choices, the final,
more general issue concerns the period over
which the empirical model is estimated. The
problem is that the reduced-form relationships
in the data are unlikely to be stable over any
reasonable sample.5  The problem, known
widely as the Lucas (1976) critique, is that pol-
icy rule changes alter the relationship among
endogenous variables in the economy. 
It is easy to see why this might happen. 
For the sake of discussion, assume that inflation
is actually determined by the following struc-
tural model:
(6) pt + 1 = art + b1X1t + b2 X2t + wt + 1,  
a110 00 0
a 210 a220 00
a 310 a320 a330 0
a410 a420 a430 a440
n 5 For a more detailed discussion, see section 4 of Cecchetti (1995).
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where rt is policy, wt + 1 is a random variable,
and X1t and X2t are measures of general eco-
nomic conditions, like things that influence ag-
gregate supply and money demand.
Next, assume that we can write down a
reaction function whereby policymakers auto-
matically change their policy control variable
when economic conditions change:
(7)    rt = g1X1t + g2 X2t + nt.
The policymaker’s role is to choose g1 and g2,
the reaction of rt to X1t  and X2t. Since the g’s
can be zero, a policy regime need not react to
the X’s. The term nt is a measure of the random
component in the policy rule.
Now, consider the reduced-form regression:
(8)     pt + 1 = f1X1t + f2 X2t + xt. 
Since  fi = a gi + bi, changes in policy, which
are changes in the g’s, will alter the correlation
between the X’s and p. In effect, the reduced-
form inflation regression subsumes the 
monetary-policy reaction function (7), so that a
change in the monetary authorities’ policy
rule—which may be a change in the relative
weight placed on various indicators—will
cause changes in (8).
As a practical matter, there are several ways
to deal with the instability that may be caused
by changes in monetary policy rules. First, one
can use institutional information to restrict the
data to a period when there were no large
changes in policy procedure. Second, one can
try to estimate the timing of structural breaks.6
Alternatively, one can use time-varying parame-
ter models, as Sims (1992) suggests. It is also
possible to simply ignore the problem and use
all of the available data.
Following my earlier work, I use only the
past decade’s data, beginning in 1984. Except-
ing the truncated sample period, I will ignore
the problems created by the Lucas critique in all
of the calculations that follow. This is an unfor-






Using monthly industrial production data for
January 1984–November 1995, the CPI for
urban wage earners (CPI-U), the Journal of
Commerce index of industrial materials prices,
and the federal funds rate, along with the trian-
gular identification in equation (5), straightfor-
ward procedures yield estimates of the aijk’s,
as well as a covariance matrix for these esti-
mates. These are the time path of the impact of
innovations on the model’s endogenous vari-
ables. They tell us how any one of the four
shocks will affect any of the four variables ini-
tially—and after several months.
It is easiest to present these results in a
series of figures. Figure 1 shows estimates of 16
impulse response functions, plotted with two
standard-error bands.7 These are the response
of output, aggregate prices, commodity prices,
and the federal funds rate to a unit innovation
to each of the four shocks.
The impulse response functions are straight-
forward and easy to understand. Taking the pol-
icy innovation as an example, the last column
of figure 1 shows the result of an unanticipated
100-basis-point change in the federal funds rate
for one month on yt, pt, pc
t, and rt over the next
three years. For example, the fourth plot in the
third row shows the impact of monetary policy
shocks (ut ) on the aggregate price level (pt).
The estimates suggest that a one-time policy
tightening—an increase in the federal funds
rate—causes prices to rise slightly initially, then
to fall below their original level after about six
months. Over the next 30 months, the price
level continues to fall. The standard-error bands
on this figure imply that we are actually very
unsure of the response. The data indicate a
strong possibility that the policy tightening will
result in a price-level increase.
Several additional features of figure 1 are
worth noting. First, in all cases, commodity
prices (second row) respond more quickly and
in the same direction as aggregate prices (third
row). Second, for the three e shocks, the output
response seems to be more precisely estimated
n 6 This is the technique used in Cecchetti (1995).
n 7 The standard-error bands in the figure are constructed using the
simple Taylor-series approximation: 
F(^ b) ~ ~F(b) + dF (b)
db | b = ^ b (^ b – b), 
where F is any differentiable function.  The variance of F(^ b) follows
immediately as
E[F(^ b) – F(b)]
2 ~ ~ [
dF (b)
db   | b = ^ b]
2 Var (^ b).
Here, we can think of the estimated impulse response functions, the
^
Aij’s,
as functions of the estimated reduced-form VAR coefficients, the elements
of  
^ R(L). Given the estimated variance of these coefficient estimates, the
variance of the  
^
Aij’s can be computed by numerical differentiation.
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a. Estimated response, with two standard-error bands.
NOTE: Horizontal axes are in months; vertical axes are in the change in the log per month.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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than the aggregate price response. This second
conclusion is consistent with Cochrane’s (1994)
observation that real output is forecastable with
high R 2 at horizons of several years, and with
my finding (see Cecchetti [1995]) that inflation
is difficult to forecast at horizons longer than a
single quarter. 
It is very tempting to seek a correspondence
between the shocks in this four-variable VAR
and those discussed in macroeconomics text-
books. In a simple model, the basic result is
that aggregate supply shocks move prices and
output in opposite directions, while aggregate
demand shocks move them in the same direc-
tion. With this categorization, the impulse re-
sponses shown in figure 1 suggest that all of the
shocks in this model come from the demand
side. While this makes intuitive sense for the
monetary policy shock, it renders the other
classifications unsatisfactory. 
One can either accept this at face value or
ask whether it might result from the identifica-
tion used to generate the estimates. Taking the
second possibility seriously leads to examina-
tion of an alternative identification—the one
proposed by Galí being a natural choice. Fig-
ure 2 plots the impulse response functions from
such a model, estimated using exactly the same
data. Because of the technical difficulty associ-
ated with their construction, I do not include
standard-error bands. Here, the results differ
markedly. It now appears that the output shock,
eyt, behaves like an aggregate supply shock,
while the three remaining shocks, representing
the aggregate price-level shock, the raw mater-
ial price shock, and the monetary policy shock,
lead to reactions consistent with those expected
from aggregate demand shocks.
However, we can draw an important positive
conclusion by comparing these two sets of
identifying restrictions: The impulse response
functions of the monetary policy shock are ro-
bust to changes in the identification procedure.
Policy’s impact on output and prices seems
fairly robust to the exact methods used in esti-
mation. Since they are easier to compute, I will
now proceed using only the estimates obtained
with the simpler triangular identification. 
Historical
Decompositions
While the ultimate goal is to use the estimated
dynamic model to construct policy rules, the
impulse response functions and structural inno-
vations also allow us to compute the quantities
known as “historical forecast decompositions.”
These allocate output and price movements
into the portions accounted for by each of the
structural shocks. It is easy to understand how
these estimates are constructed from the struc-
tural model’s equations (1)–(4):
Define the impact of the monetary policy







and analogously for the other shocks. Its esti-









^ ut – i,
where 
^ ut  is the estimated monetary policy
innovation. 
Figure 3 plots the decomposition of the
movements in real output and aggregate prices
into the components attributable to monetary
and nonmonetary shocks. In constructing these,
I have truncated the sum in (9) at 60 months.
Because of the difficulty in identifying innova-
tions from nonmonetary sources, it seems pru-
dent to simply sum them together. That is, I plot
the fluctuations in yt and pt attributable to ut,  
^
Hyu(t), and  
^
Hpu(t), and the portion not attribut-
able to policy, [yt –
^
Hyu(t)] and [pt –
^
Hpu(t)].
The results show that, for the past seven
years, important movements in both output
and prices are largely accounted for by inno-
vations other than those coming from mone-





Hpu(t) in the figure’s two panels has much
less variation than the green line representing
the fluctuations in yt and pt that are attribut-
able to nonmonetary policy shocks. This result
is particularly striking for prices, where varia-
tion seems to be driven by innovations to out-
put, raw materials prices, and the aggregate
price level itself. Aggregate supply shocks and
nonmonetary aggregate demand shocks ac-





The main use of the empirical model described
in section I and estimated in section II is to pro-
vide quantitative answers to the questions re-
quired for implementing a policy rule. To see
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review





NOTE: Horizontal axes are in months; vertical axes are in the change in the log per month.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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how this is done, first note that the model
implies estimated values for the aggregate price
level and real output: 
(11)
^ pt =  
^ A11 (L) 
^ ept +  




^ eyt +  
^ A14 (L)ut,
(12)  
^ yt =  
^ A31 (L) 
^ ept +  
^ A32 (L) 
^ ect
+  
^ A33 (L) 
^ eyt +  
^ A34 (L)ut .
A policy rule is a sequence of ut’s that is
constructed to meet some objective. In other
words, the policymaker is allowed to pick the
path of the federal funds rate to meet a particu-
lar objective.8
The monetary policy literature includes many
discussions of the efficacy of various objective
functions. Mankiw (1994) includes several pa-
pers that deal with this topic explicitly. There
are two primary candidates: price-level targets
and nominal-income targets. One version of
these involves setting the policy instrument—
the ut’s in the model—to minimize the average
expected mean square error (MSE) of either
inflation or nominal-income growth over some
future horizon. In the inflation case, the objec-
tive function can be written as







^ pi – po)2,
where po is the log of the base-period price
level and h is the policymaker’s horizon. The
expectation in (13) is over the sampling distrib-
ution of ^ p, which is related to the covariance
matrix of the estimated coefficients in equation
(11). Nominal-income targeting simply replaces
the log price level in (13) with the sum of pt
and yt . 
One important distinction between the ob-
jective function (13) and more standard formu-
lations is the treatment of parameter uncertainty.
As the results in figure 1 clearly show, we are
very unsure about the size and timing of price
movements following innovations to the federal
funds rate. When constructing a policy rule, it
seems prudent to account for this lack of
knowledge. 
As Brainard (1967) originally pointed out, the
presence of uncertainty has important implica-
tions. This is easily demonstrated in the present
context. Consider a simplified version of the
structural price and interest rate equations
(14) pt =  ept+  gut
(15)  rt = ut,
where  g is a parameter. Next, take the horizon
in (13) to be one period (h = 1), and the initial
log price level to be zero, po = 0. The policy







Substituting in the expression for pt, this is
simply
(17)     min
{ui}
E [epi + g
^ui]2.







Economic Review 1996 Q111
If we ignore that g is estimated, then it is trivial
to generate the policy rule. It is just
(18)   u *
i = – 1
g
^ epi.
Taking account of uncertainty in the estimate of
g, but continuing to assume that ept is known,
the minimization problem yields 









For a given ept, this leads to an unambigu-
ously smaller response. In other words, impre-
cision creates caution, with policy reactions be-
ing muted in the face of uncertainty. 
Reactions are further attenuated if policy-
makers attach a cost to the movement in instru-
ment. Taking the same simple setup, imagine









This produces the reaction function









which will yield an even smoother path for the
interest rate than does (19). 
Results
I examine results based on several policy objec-
tives. It is worth noting that the exercise de-
scribed here appears to be a gross violation of
the Lucas critique. That is to say, contrary to the
implications of the discussion in section I, I as-
sume that the reduced-form correlations among
output, prices, and interest rates described by
equations (11) and (12) are unaffected by the
change in the policymaker’s reaction function. 
There are two ways to defend the procedure.
The first is to take the view of Sims (1982)—
that parameters in these models evolve slowly
enough to make Lucas-critique considerations
quantitatively unimportant. The second defense
is to reinterpret the exercise as an attempt to
recover the objective function that policymak-
ers were implicitly using, by trying to match the
actual federal funds rate path with that implied
by an optimal rule.
I report results for three different policy
rules. The first, which might be termed passive,
holds the federal funds rate fixed in the face of
the shock. (The model makes it clear that this 
is not really a passive policy, since it involves
shocks to overcome the estimated reaction func-
tion.) The other two, which I will call active,
minimize the average MSE of either the log of
the price level or the log of nominal output
over a 36-month horizon (h = 36).9  For each
rule, I examine three experiments—one for
each structural shock. In each of the nine re-
sulting cases, ejo = 1 and  elk = 0 for l = / j and 
k  = / 0. In other words, there is a unit innovation
to one of the structural disturbances in the base
period, and that is all. I then construct individ-
ual estimates for the optimal response of inter-
est rates to each of the shocks.
Figure 4 reports the implied path of the
federal funds rate, aggregate prices, and indus-
trial production for each policy objective in
response to each of the three structural shocks.
The fixed federal funds rate policy results in
consistently higher output and prices than does
either of the other two polices. The activist
policies both have the same profile, whatever
the source of the shock. Output and prices
both rise initially, and then fall, with output
dropping more than prices.
Interestingly, both of the activist policies in-
volve raising the funds rate immediately and
then lowering it slowly. This follows directly
from the fact that prices respond slowly to pol-
icy innovations (see the third row of figure 1).
The implication is that a policymaker who
wishes to stabilize prices must respond to exog-
enous shocks quickly, in order to ensure that
future price movements are minimized. That is
the argument for the Federal Reserve’s tighten-
ing up at the first sign of upward price pressure. 
Comparing Targeting
Objectives
These calculations have direct implications for
the debate between advocates of price-level tar-
geting and those who favor targeting nominal
GDP. To see why, I have computed the implied
root-mean-square error (RMSE) for inflation and
nominal income for each policy. For the price-
targeting case, these are the square root of the
minimized objective function (13).
Table 1 shows the results. The computations
suggest that nominal-income targeting has a
certain robustness, since inclusion of real out-
put in the objective function increases the
RMSE for inflation only slightly. For the case of
an output shock, the increase is from 0.24 to
0.61. However, when the output shock is the
n 9 Because the model is estimated in logs, the minimum MSE of the
nominal-income policy minimized the MSE of the sum of the log of indus-
trial production and the log of the CPI.
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FIGURE 4
Interest Rate, Output, and
Price Paths following Shocks, 
and the Policy Response
Min MSE (p) policy Fixed interest rate policy Min MSE (p + y.
)
NOTE: Horizontal axes are in months; vertical axes are in the change in the log per month.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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source of the instability, the move from price-
level targeting to nominal-income targeting
decreases the RMSE of nominal income sub-
stantially—from 4.12 to 0.69. In other words,
the inability to estimate precisely either the
impact of shocks on prices or prices’ response
to policy innovations argues strongly for includ-




Finally, one might ask how closely recent pol-
icy conforms to what would have been implied
by either the price-level or nominal-income tar-
geting rules plotted in figure 5. A simulated 
interest-rate path can be calculated by taking
the estimated structural innovations, the 
^ ejt’s,
and then computing the optimal policy re-
sponses implied by each rule before substitut-
ing the result into the equation for the federal
funds rate, which is the equivalent of (11).10
Figure 5 compares the actual path of the fed-
eral funds rate with that implied by the esti-
mated price-level and nominal-income targeting
policies. When we examine the figure, several
findings emerge. First, targeting the price level
alone yields larger swings, as the funds rate
reaches both higher and lower extremes. The
actual funds rate is the least variable, looking
like a smoothed version of the two simulated
paths, but the general character of the plot sug-
gests that the optimal policy response simply
involves faster, bigger movements than those
on the actual path.11
Figure 5, however, allows an even more
interesting conclusion. From its results, it is
possible to infer something about the proce-
dures policymakers were actually following.
Such a calculation does not violate the Lucas
critique, since it is an attempt to recover the
loss function implicit in the policy actions we
actually observed.
The estimates imply that the actual funds-
rate path was very similar to one that would
TABLE 1
Comparison of Policy Responses
FIGURE 5
Comparison of Optimal and Actual
Federal Funds Rate Pathsa
Average RMSE of Inflation over a 36-Month Horizon
Source of Shock
Aggregate Commodity
Policy Rule Price Price Output
Fixed interest rate  2.35 1.98 1.14
Min MSE (p + y
.
) 2.15 1.50 0.61
Min MSE (p) 0.99 0.51 0.24
Average RMSE of Nominal Income over a 36-Month Horizon
Source of Shock
Aggregate Commodity
Policy Rule Price Price Output
Fixed interest rate  1.86 4.89 6.19
Min MSE (p + y
.
) 0.32 0.35 0.69
Min MSE (p) 0.99 10.85 4.12
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
p
p
a. Monthly data, June 1987 to November 1995.
SOURCES: Author’s calculations; and Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
n 10 Performing the calculations in this way ignores a number of ele-
ments. In particular, there is no guarantee that the policy rules generated
from the artificial experiment of one unit shock in one ejk  at a time will be
robust to sequences of shocks in all the ejk’s simultaneously. One clear
reason for this is that it ignores the covariance of estimated coefficients
both within and across the elements of the  ^ Aij (L)’s.
n 11 As one would expect, these large policy innovations result in less
stable real output, highlighting that the ultimate issue in policymaking is
still the relative weight of prices and output in the objective function.
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have been implied by a nominal-income target-
ing procedure, only smoother. It is as if, over
the past decade or so, the federal funds rate
had been set to conform to a nominal-income
targeting regime, but with policymakers attach-
ing a cost to actually moving the funds rate.
That is, the objective function that we can con-
struct from the actual path of interest rates
would minimize the sum of squared deviations
in nominal income from a target path and
squared movements in the federal funds rate,
over a horizon of about three years.
IV. Summary
The information requirements for any policy
rule are daunting. Not only do policymakers
need timely information about current eco-
nomic conditions, they also need forecasts of
the future path of the variables they wish to
control (aggregate prices and real output) and
quantitative estimates of how their actions will
affect these objectives.
This paper’s purpose is to suggest that much
of our knowledge is very inexact, and that our
inability to precisely forecast the results of pol-
icy changes should make us cautious. Even
more important, the fact that we have a much
better understanding of the impact of our poli-
cies on real output than on prices suggests that
nominal-income targeting rules are more robust
than price targeting rules. From a purely prag-
matic viewpoint, someone who cares about
nominal income is made substantially worse off
by moving to a price-level target, which desta-
bilizes real output considerably. Thus, practical
issues make a strong argument for nominal-
income targeting.
In addition, we have seen that the actual
path of interest rates over the past decade is
very similar to that implied by a nominal-
income targeting rule, albeit one in which inter-
est rate movements are viewed as costly. By
comparing the actual interest-rate path with the
path implied by the nominal-income targeting
rule, we see that policymakers have smoothed
interest rate movements more than the rule
would have dictated, but not by much.
Appendix: 
Identification
To understand the more general issues of identi-
fication, it is useful to rewrite the four-equation
model [(1)–(4)] in a more compact form:
(A1) xt = A(L)et, 
where xt and et are now vectors, and A(L) is a
matrix of lag polynomials. We can also write the
model in its more familiar VAR reduced form as 
(A2)  R(L)xt = ht ,
where R(0) = I, the ht’s are i.i.d. (implying that
they are orthogonal to the lagged xt’s), and
E(hh¢) = S. It immediately follows that A(L)et
= R(L)–1ht. This allows us to write A(0)et = ht,
and A(L) = R(L)–1A(0). As a result, given esti-
mates of A(0), R(L), and h, we can recover
estimates of both the structural innovations—
the et’s—and the structural parameters—the
components of A(L). 
The issue of identification is the problem of
estimating A(0). To show how this is done,
note that A(0)E(ee¢)A(0)¢ = S, where E(ee¢) is
diagonal by construction. Normalizing E(ee¢) =
I, we obtain the result that A(0)A(0)¢ = S. In a
system with n variables, S has [n (n +1)
2 ] unique
elements, and so complete identification re-
quires an additional [n (n –1)
2 ]restrictions. In a
four-variable model, six more restrictions are
needed. This is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for identification. Sufficiency can 
be established by proving that the restrictions
lead to construction of an A(0) matrix that is
invertible.
The long-run restrictions of the Galí-style
identification can be understood by defining
A(1) as the matrix of long-run effects computed
by summing the coefficients in A(L). That is,






There are two long-run restrictions. The first
is that the impact of  ept  and ut  on yt is transi-
tory, and so A31(1) = A34(1) = 0. The second is
that ept and ut have no permanent impact on
the relative price of commodities, (pct – pt ), that
is, A11(1) – A21(1) = A14(1) – A24(1) = 0.
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